微观经济学

作者简介

微观经济学（第三版），ISBN：9787810443616，作者：卡茨（Katz，M.L.），罗森（Rosen，H.S.）著

书籍目录

Brief Contents

Chapter 1 The Market Economy 1

PART ONE

The Household

Chaptcr 2 Consumer Choice

Chapter 3 Comparative Statics and

Demand

Appendix 3A An Algebraic

Approach to Consumer

Choice

Chapter 4 Price Changes and Consumer

Welfare

Chapter 5 The Household as

Supplier

Chaptert choice under Umcertainty

Chapter 7 The Firm and Its Goals

Chapter 8 Tcchnology and

Production

Chapter 9 Cost

Appendix 9A An Algebraic

Approach to Technology and

Cost

PART THREE

The Competitive Model

Chapter 10 The Price-Taking Firm

hapter 11 Equilibrium in Competitive

Markets

Chapter 12 General Equilibrium and

Welfare Economics

PART FOUR

Market Power

Chapter 13 Monopoly

Chapter 14 More on Price-Making

Firms

Chapter 15 Oligopoly and Strategic

Behavior

Chapter 16 Game Theory

PART FIVE

Missing Markets

Chapter 17 Asymmetric Information

Chapter 18 Externalities and Public

Goods

Progress Check Solutions

References

Index

Contents

Chapter 1 The Market Economy

1.1 Scarcity and Economics

The Three Questions

1. What Is to Be Produced?

2. How Is It to Be Produced?

3. Who Gets the Output?

Section Recap

1.2 Models

A Model ofSchool Attendance

Positive and Normative Analysis

Section Recap

1.3 Thc Workings of a Price System:

Preview

Thc Circular Flow Model

The Supply and Demand Model

Demand

Supply

Equilibrium

Supply and Demand for Inputs

The RolesofPrices

Is This All There Is to It?

Section Recap

PART ONE

The Household

Chapter 2 Consumer Choice

2.1 BasicSetup

2.2 Tastes

Assumption 1 (Completeness)

Assumption 2 (Transitivity)

Assumption 3 (Nonsatiation)

Deriving an Indifference Curve

Assumption 4 (Diminishing Marginal Ratc of

Subsriturion)

Deriving an Indifference Map

Summary ofProperties oflndiffcrence

Curves

Other Types oflndifference Curves

Perfect Substitutes

Perfect Complements

"Bads"

Utility Thcory: Assigning Numbers to

Indifference Curves

Ordinal versus Cardinal Utility

Section Recap

2.3 Budget Constraints

Price-Taking Consumers

Changes in Prices and Income

Summary of Properties of Linear Budget

Constraints

Nonlinear Budget Constraints

Quantity Rationing

Quantity Discounts

Section Recap

2.4 The Consumer's Equilibrium

Interior Solutions

Corner Solutions

Equilibrium with Composite Commodities

Using Utility to Characterize the Consumer's

Equilibrium

Preliminary Evaluation ofthe Theory of

Choice

Section Recap

Chapter 3 Comparative Statics and

Demand

3.1 Price and Income Changes

Own-Price Changes

Derivation ofthe Individual's Demand

Curve

Cross-Price Changes

Demand Curves and Cross-Price Effects

Income Changes

Income Consumption Curve

Demand Curves and Income Changes

Interpreting Data on Consumer Demand

Markct Demand

Individual versus Market Demand

Curves

Section Recap

3.2 Comparative Statics Applied

In-Kind Transfers

Charitable Giving

Section Recap

3.3 Elasticity

Price Elasticity of Demand

Computing Elasticities

Price Elasticity and Total Expenditure

Determinants of the Price Elasticity of

Demand

Price Elasticity for Some Special Cases

Vertical Demand Curve

Horizontal Demand Curve

Unit Elastic Demand Curve

Linear Demand Curve

Cross-Price Elasticity ofDemand

Income Elasticity ofDemand

Section Recap

Appendix 3A An Algebraic Approach to

Consumer Choice

3A.l Utility and Marginal Utility

3A.2 The Lagrange Method for Finding the

Consumer's Equilibrium Deriving Demand

Curves

3A.3 Elasticity

Chapter 4 Price Changes and Consumer

Welfare

4.1 Income and Substitution Effects

Graphical Representation

Algebraic Representation

Section Recap

4.2 Compensating and Equivalent

Variations

Compensating Variation (CV)

Equivalent Variation (EV)

Comparing the CV and EV

Section Recap

4.3 Applying Compensating and Equivalcnt

Variations

Evaluating Price Subsidies

President Carter's Gasoline Tax

Section Recap

4.4 Consumer Surplus

The Demand Curve as a Marginal Valuation

Schedule

Prices and Consumer Surplus

Effect of Price Changes on Consumer

Surplus

Application ofConsumcr Surplus: Analysis ofa

Trade Quota

"Exact" Consumer Surplus and the Compensated

Demand Curve

Compcnsated Demand Curve

Section Recap

Chapter 5 The Household as Supplier

5.1 LaborSupply

Budget Constraint and Indifference Curves

Comparative Statics with the Consumption-

Leisure Model

Labor Supply Curve

Preliminary Evaluation

The Work Incendves ofAFDC

Producer Surplus

Unemploymcnt Insurance

The Supply ofLabor to Occupadons

arket Supply Curve ofLabor

Occupadonal Choice

Secdon Recap

5.2 Capital Supply

Life-Cyde Model

Intertemporal Budget Constraint

Intertemporal Indifference Map

Equilibrium in the Life-Cycle Mode

Comparativc Statics with the Life-Cycle

Model

Saving and Interest Rates

SupplyofSaving

Is the Life-Cycle Model Relevant?

The Taxation of Interest Income

Section Recap

5.3 More on Present Value

Fundamental Formulas

Prescnt Value in Action

Michael Wittkowski's Lottery Price

"Truth-in-Lending" Laws

Perpctuitics

Secrion Recap

5.4 Human Capital

Human Capital as the Only Asset

Human and Physical Capital

Section Recap

Chapter 6 Choice under Uncertainty

6.1 Gambles and Contingent

Commodities

Budget Constraint

Probabilitywid Expected Value

The Fair Odds Line

Preferences

Equilibrium

Section Recap

6.2 Some Applications of Condngent

Commodities

Risk Premia

The Rolc of Diversification

Tax Evasion

Designing Policy toward Evasion

Evaluating the Tax Evasion Model

Secrion Recap

6.3 Insurance

Fair Insurancc

Budget Constraint with Fair Insurance

Preferences

Equilibrium Amount ofFair Insurance

The Demand for "Unfair" Insurance

Changing the Premium

Changing the Probability ofa Lawsuit

The Importance of Insurance

Section Recap

6.4 Decision Making with Many Uncertain

Outcomes: von Neumann-Morgenstern

Utility

Decision Trees

Utility Functions for Uncertain Situations

Sequenrial Decisions

Applying von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

Functions: The Value oflnformation

Section Recap

The Firm

Chapter 7 The Firm and Its Goals

7.1 What Do Firms Do?

Why Do Firms Exist?

Economic Profit

User Cost of Capital

Apple Computer Forgets How to Price

Memory

Section Recap

7.2 The Firm as Supplier: The Profit-

Maximizing Level of Output

Total Revenue Curve

Total Economic Cost Curve

Maximizing Profit

The Optimal Output Level for an Active

Firm

The Shut-Down Dedsion

Refractories: Staying in Business to Lose

Money

East Germany: Shutting Down an

Economy

Section Recap

7.3 Do Firms Really Maximize Profits?

The Divorce of Ownership and Control

Control Mechanisms

Internal Control Mechanisms

External Control Mechanisms

Section Recap

7.4 Profit Maximizarion over Time and under

Uncertainty

Intertemporal Choice

Stockholder Myopia?

Decisions under Uncertainty

Policy Implications ofExpected Profit

Maximization

Gold Mines, Shutdown, and Opdon

Value

Secrion Recap

Chapter 8 Technology and Production

8.1 Technology

The Production Function

Isoquants

How Many Inputs?

What Is Output?

The Decision-Making Horizon

Section Recap

8.2 Properties ofthe Proauction Function

Marginal Physical Product

Increasing Marginal Returns

Constant Marginal Returns

Diminishing Marginal Returns

A Changing Pattern ofMarginal

Returns

Marginal Rate ofTechnical Substitution

Two Polar Cases ofFactor Substiturion

The Relationship between MPP and

MRTS

Returns to Scale

Constant Returns to Scale

Increasing Returns to Scale

Decreasing Returns to Scale

Graphing Returns to Scale

Marginal Returns and Returns to Scale

Secrion Recap

Chapter 9 Cost

9. l Cost in the Short Run

Properties ofShort-Run Costs

Variable Cost

Marginal Cost

Average Cost

The Relationship between Short-Run

Marginal Cost and Short-Run Average

Variable Cost

Secrion Recap

9.2 Cost in the Long Run

Graphical Analysis

Isocost Lines

Finding the Economically Efficicnt Input

Mix

Algebraic Interpretation

Comparative Statics

Factor Prices

Technology

The Nature ofOutput

Output Level

Summary of Comparative Statics

Analysis

Deriving the Long-Run Total Cost Curve

Properties ofLong-Run Costs

Long-Run Marginal Cost

Long-Run Average Cost

Long-Run Costs Compared to Short-Run

Costs

Section Recap

Appendix 9A: An Algebraic Approach'to

Technology and Cost

9A.l Properriesofthe Production

Function

9A.2 Cost Minimization in the Long Run

9A.3 More than Two Factors of

Production

Properties ofthe Production Function

Cost Minimization in the Long Run: The

Lagrange Method

9A.4 Estimating Production Functions

Alternative Strategics

Cstimation Problems

Using the Cobb-Douglas Production

Function

PART THREE

The Competitive Model

Chapter lO The Price-Taking Firm

lO.l Supply in Product Markets

Two Rules for Profit Maximizarion

Marginal Output Rule

Shut-Down Rule

The LongandtheShortofthe Matter

Short-Run Supply Curves

The Firm's Short-Run Supply Curve

Long-Run Supply Curves

Deriving a Firm's Long-Run Supply

Curve

Comparison ofthe Firm's Short- and Long-

Run Supply Curves

Section Recap

l0.2 Factor Demand

Short-Run Factor Demand

The Marginal Benefit ofan Input

The Marginal Cost of an Input

The Profit-Maximizing Input Level

Long-Run Factor Demand

Factor Substitution Effect

Output Effect

Factor Substitution and Output Effect

Simultaneously

Algebraic Approach

Investment and the Demand for

Capital

Secrion Recap

Chapterll Equilibrium in Competitive

Markcts

l l. l The Basic Model of Perfect

Competition

Fundamental Assumptions

The Appropriate Market Structure

Identifying a Competitive Market

Structure

Finding a Competitive Equilibrium

The Short Run

Market Supply by Firms

Market Demand

Market Equilibrium

The Individual Supplier's Perspective

TheRoleofPrice

The Long Run

Market Supply

Market Demand

Market Equilibrium

The Individual Supplier's Perspective

The Long Run Is a Short Run Too

Input Price Taking by the Firm But Not by the

Industry

Heterogeneous Suppliers

Short-Run Analysis

Long-Run Analysis

Economic Rent

Secrion Recap: Four Steps to Finding an

Equilibrium

l1.2 Using the Competitive Model

The EffectsofTaxes

Elasticities and Incidence

Who Pays for Social Sccurity?

The Elasticity ofDerived Demand

Section Recap

l l. 3 Normative Analysis of Perfect

Competition

Total Surplus as a Measure ofPerformance

Are Value Judgments Being Made?

Prices versus Quanriries and Their Roles in

Attaining Efficiency

Evaluating Rent Control

Normative Analysis of a Sales Tax

Section Recap

Chapter 12 General Equilibrium and

Wclfare Economics

l 2. l General Equilibrium Analysis

Supply and Demand Curves

Gencral Equilibrium Analysis ofthe

Minimum Wage

General Equilibrium in a Pure Exchange

Economy

Edgeworth Box

Section Recap

12.2 Welfare Economics

Consumption Efficiency

Consumption Efficiency and Water

Rationing

Production Efficicncy

Production Possibilitides Curve

Pareto Efficiency

The First Fundamental Theorem ofWelfare

Economics

Intuition behind the First Welfare

Theorem

Prices and Decentralization

Are Competirive Prices Fair?

The Theory ofthe Second Best

The First Welfare Theorem and Total Surplus

Analysis

The Second Fundamental Theorem ofWelfare

Economics

Section Recap

12.3 The Welfare Economics ofTime and

Uncertainty

Efficiency and Intertemporal Resource

Allocation

Efficiency and Uncertainty

Section Recap

12.4 Welfare Economics and the Real

World

Market Failure

Market Power

Nonexistence ofMarkets

Market Failure and a Role for Government

Intervention

Equity

Buying into Welfare Economics

Section Recap

Market Power

Chapter 13Monopoly

13.l The Basic Monopoly Model

The Fundamental Assumptions

The Appropriate Market Structure

Equilibrium

Marginal Revenue for a Monopolist

Applying the Rules for Profit

Maximization

Price Elasticity and Profit Maximization

Thc Long and the Short of Monopoly

Monopoly Comparcd to Perfect

Competition

Taxing a Monopolist

Incentives to Innovate

Process Innovation

Product Innovation

Section Recap

l 3.2 Normative Analysis ot Monopoly

Equity

Efficiency

A Partial Equilibrium Analysis

A General Equilibrium Analysis

Scction Recap

13.3 Public Policy toward Monopoly

Patent Policy

Antitrust Policy

Determinants ofMarket Structure

Regulation ofMonopoly

Section Rccap

13.4 Price Discrimination

Conditions Necessary for Profitable Price

Discrimination

First-Degree Price Discrimination

Welfare Effects ofFirst-Degree Price

Discrimination

Second-Degree Price Discrimination

Welfare Effects ofSecond-Degree Price

Discrimination

Third-Degree Price Discrimination

Welfare Effects ofThird-Degree Price

Discrimination

Section Recap

Chapter 14 More on Price-Making Firms

14.1 Cartels

Cartels in Product Markets

The Full Cartel Outcome

Cheating on Cartel Agreements

Entry as a Limit on Cartel Success

Regulation as Cartel Enforcement

The Welfare Cost ofMonopoly

Reconsidered

Labor Unions

Secdon Recap

14.2 Monopolistic Competition

The Fundamental Assumptions

The Appropriate Market Structure

Equilibrium

Short-Run Equilibrium

Long-Run Equilibrium

Normarive Analysis ofMonopolistic

Competition

The So-Called Excess Capacity

Theorem

The Market Equilibrium Compared with the

Efficient Outcome

Secrion Recap

14.3 Monopsony

The Fundamental Assumptions

The Appropriate Market Structure

The Monopsonistic Equilibrium

Marginal Factor Cost for a

Monopsonist

Equilibrium

Normarive Analysis ofMonopsony

Equity

Efficiency

Buycr Cartels: Amateur and Professional

Athletes

Secrion Recap

Chapter 15 Oligopoly and Strategic

Behavior

The Fundamental Assumptions

The Appropriate Market Structure

l 5. l Quantity-Setting Oligopolists

Market Equilibrium

Equilibrium Defincd

Finding a Cournot Equilibrium

Deriving the Best-Response Functions

Using Reaction Curves to Find the Cournot

Equilibrium

Comparison ofCournot, Monopoly, and Perfect

Competirion

Viability ofthe Full Cartel Agreement

Are We Back to Perfect Competition?

An Algebraic Example ofCournot

Equilibrium

Assumptions ofthe Examplc

Calculating the Reaction Curves

Calculating the Cournot Equilibrium

Comparative Statics

Comparison of Cournot Duopoly,

Competition, and Monopoly

Section Recap

15.2 Pricc-Setting Oligopolists

Bertrand Competition

Finding the Bertrand Equilibrium

Cournot or Bertrand?

Why Are Bertrand and C.ournot Duopolies So

Differcnt?

Which Model Should We Use?

Section Recap

15.3 Cooperation and Punishment

A Model ofRepeated Interaction

General Predictions

Market Structure and Collusion

Section Recap

Chapter 16 Game Theory

16.1 Some Fundamentals of Game Theory

Game Trees: Decision Trees for Strategic

Situations

Dominant Stratcgy Equilibrium

Perfect Equilibrium

Secrion Recap

16.2 Applying Game Theory: Oligopoly with

Entry

Credible Threats and Commitment

More on Strategic Invcstment in Oligopoly

Section Recap

16.3 Games oflmperfect and Incomplete

Information

The Prisoners' Dilemma: A Game oflmperfect

Information

Mixed Strategies

A Bargaining Game of Incomplete

Information

Limiring Pricing: A Game oflncomplete

Information

Section Recap

16.4 Repeated Games

Finitely Repeated Games

Section Rccap

Missing Markets

Chapter l7 Asymmetric Information

17.1 Signaling and Screening

Another Look at Price Discrimination

Normative Analysis ofSecond-Degree Price

Discrimination

Real-World Screening

Comperitive Market Signaling

Normative Analysis of Educauon as a

Signal

Is Educarion Really Just a Signal?

Section Recap

17.2 Adverse Selection

More on Insurance Markets

The Full-lnformation Equilibrium

The Asymmetric-lnformation

Equilibrium

The Efficicncy Effects ofAdverse

Selection

Market Responses to Adverse Selection

Other Markets in Which Adverse Selection Is

Important

Labor Markets

The Market for Human Blood

Government Responses to Hidden

Characteristics

Section Recap

l7.3 Hidden Actions

Moral Hazard in insurance Markets

Fire Prevention in the Absence of

Insurance

Moral Hazard and the Effects of

Insurance

Effidency Eftects ofMoral Hazard

Co-lnsurance and Deductibles

Employer-Employee Relationships

Observable Shirking

Unobservable Shirking

Two Puzzles

Moral Hazard in Product Markets

Reputation as a Hostage

Section Recap

Chapter 18 Externalities and Public

Goods

l 8. l Externalities and Efficiency

Missing Markets

Private Cost versus Social Cost

Section Recap

18.2 Responses to Externalities

Private Responses

Mergers

Social Conventions

Bargaining and the Coase Theorem

Rcasons for Failure ofNegotiations

Government Responses to Externalities

Regulation

Corrective Taxes

Creating a Market

Section Recap

18.3 PublicGoods

Efficient Provision ot' Public Goods

Impure Public Goods

Market Provision of Public Goods

Responses to the Public-Good Problem

Section Recap

Progress Check Solutions

References

Index

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