YC创业营: 硅谷顶级创业孵化器如何改变世界
出版日期:2014-8-1
ISBN:9787213061585
作者:兰德尔·斯特罗斯 (Randall Stross)
页数:251页
作者简介
在互联网创业成本日益降低、融资却越来越难的今天，硅谷的Y Combinator因何成为全世界创业者趋之若鹜的创业圣地？为什么25岁左右的青年最适合创业？创业者如何才能在遴选面试中脱颖而出？为什么YC特别看好那些主要由黑客组成的创业团队? YC真的歧视女性吗？如何想出能够赢得投资的新点子？创业者应该如何寻找联合创始人？
获准进入Y Combinator及其创业公司全程跟踪批量投资项目的第一人，兰德尔·斯特罗斯首度探访硅谷最神秘的创业营Y Combinator，全面揭秘硅谷创业教父保罗·格雷厄姆撼动互联网创业模式的幕后故事。《YC创业营》详细记录了YC 2011年夏季批量投资项目64家初创企业孵化全过程、保罗· 格雷厄姆指导创业公司融资技巧、创业者吸引投资演讲诀窍、高度私密的YC演示日全记录……
书籍目录
前言 走进 YC，走近硅谷明日之星
第一部分 面试:挑出对的人
第 1 章 寻找最小创业年龄
年轻无极限
谷歌和雅虎的故事说明了毕业生也能建立成功的创业公司。随着人们对创业年龄的通常期望逐渐下降, YC 成为一种寻找最小创业年龄的方法。
第 2 章 理想创业者的武器
精力、贫穷、无根、同窗与无知
25岁的年轻人可以说占尽了天时地利人和,他们拥有名为“精力、贫穷、无根、同窗和无知”的武器。
第二部分 修炼:与 YC 一起创业
第 3 章 誓师大会
超过一半的人会失败
不要指望 YC 合伙人会随时跟在你们屁股后面,纠正每一个错误。在这里，如果你不努力工作，市场就会炒你鱿鱼。要知道,你们中有超过一半的人最终会失败。
第 4 章 创业团队现状
男多女少
只有男生才会在大学期间创业的说法已是陈年老调,现在的情况是:巾帼不让须眉。而进入 YC 的女性稀少的真实原因，是递交申请的女性就稀少。
第 5 章 搬到硅谷去
一个疯狂即正常的地方
对很多人来说,创业是一件疯狂的事情,但硅谷里的那些人似乎将创业当成了家常便饭。毫不夸张地说,在那里,创业就是他们的生活。
第 6 章 会面时间
与 YC 合伙人面对面
创业是一件极其困难的事,很多事情,合伙人必须面对面才能跟创业者讲清楚。所以,YC 专门设置了让创业者与合伙人交流的时间：会面时间。
第 7 章 快速发布
第一版产品应该让你感到羞愧
一定要尽可能快地将想法转变成具有最基本功能的产品。即便只是个原型产品,你只有将其送到客户的手中,才有可能知道他们究竟想要什么。
第 8 章 最友好的投资条件
创始基金与额外投资
创始基金给创业者提供最友好的投资条件,是因为他们知道如果提供的条件稍差一丁点,那么那家选择放弃的创业公司很可能就是之后取得最大成功的那一家。
第 9 章 与顾客见面
测试创业想法
如果一家创业公司是完全由黑客团队组建起来的, 那么最好的消息莫过于听说这些创业者正在搞商业。他们一定要走出去,与顾客见面。
第 10 章 招募克隆人军团
快速占领市场
如果你的创业团队需要销售人才,可以尝试在黑客新闻网发帖。有好多热衷于创业的人在阅读黑 客新闻网,这些非技术型人才拼命地想要加入某家 YC 创业公司。
第 11 章 原型日
了解其他创业公司在做什么
原型日是为了让所有的创业者都有机会了解同窗们在做些什么。每家创业公司都要向大家介绍自 己正在研究的课题,每个人都将系统性地了解其他人在做些什么。
第 12 章 黑客马拉松
同窗创业者的聚会
黑客马拉松为各自在家办公的创业者提供了交流的机会。他们约好时间地点一起工作,针对大家 共有的问题分享解决方案,并相互交流与YC有关的小道消息。
第 13 章 不断寻找新想法
在触礁时改变创业方向
在互联网世界里,除非你真的能做得非常非常大,否则就连中型互联网公司也很容易被更庞大的对手侵吞市场份额。所以,你必须不断寻找新想法。
第14章 拐点会议
得到所有 YC 合伙人的帮助
在拐点会议上,某个创业团队可以得到所有YC合伙人全心全意的指导。只有那些正处于关键转 折点,需要许多合伙人出谋划策的团队才有幸参与。
第 15 章 联合创始人
从搭档到“夫妻”
YC极少给只有一名创业者的团队投资,因为你需要有人帮你分担压力,但创业团队的人数也不能太多,4个创业者就会让决策的制定变得非常困难。
第三部分 冲刺:谁是下一个 DROPBOX
第 16 章 备战演示日
为投资者的问题准备好答案
演示日的逼近会让那些公司尚处于起步阶段的创业者担心该如何让投资人相信他们天花乱坠的说辞。所以,创业者需要把合伙人当成投资人,练习介绍自己的想法。
第17章 排练日
学习其他创业者的优点
演示日前的最后一周是排练日。在这一周里,创业者们将面临连续7天的排练以及YC合伙人的各种 批评。
第 18 章 确定演示内容
斟酌每一个微妙的细节
演示日近在眼前。创业者们聚在YC的大厅里练习演讲,轮流上台演练。等待上台的团队都在不停地检查自己的幻灯片,字斟句酌地思考着每一个微妙的细节。
第 19 章 演示日
脱胎换骨的创业者
演示日诱人的地方可不仅仅是其中一家创业公司可能会快速成长为价值数十亿美元的明星企业，还有一点是，现在投资的时机较早。
第 20 章 永不言弃
硅谷会原谅失败者
只有当创业者放弃的时候,创业才算真正地失败了。不过，那也没有关系，硅谷会原谅失败者。
结语 无限的可能
附录 YC批量投资项目
译者后记
内容概要
兰德尔·斯特罗斯（Randall Stross）
斯坦福大学历史学博士，圣何塞大学商学院教授，斯坦福大学东亚研究中心研究员。
《纽约时报》“数字领域”专栏作家，主要负责硅谷企业和科技方面的报道。获准进入高度机密的谷歌总部从事采访活动的第一人，获准进入YC及其创业公司全程跟踪批量投资项目的第一人。
畅销书《硅谷教父》（eBoys）、《谷歌星球》（Planet Google）和《洛园的巫师》（The Wizard of Menlo Park）作者。
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http://www.paulgraham.com/startupmistakes.htmlOctober 2006In the Q & A period after a recent talk, someone asked what made startups fail. After standing there gaping for a few seconds I realized this was kind of a trick question. It's equivalent to asking how to make a startup succeed—if you avoid every cause of failure, you succeed—and that's too big a question to answer on the fly.Afterwards I realized it could be helpful to look at the problem from this direction. If you have a list of all the things you shouldn't do, you can turn that into a recipe for succeeding just by negating. And this form of list may be more useful in practice. It's easier to catch yourself doing something you shouldn't than always to remember to do something you should. [1]In a sense there's just one mistake that kills startups: not making something users want. If you make something users want, you'll probably be fine, whatever else you do or don't do. And if you don't make something users want, then you're dead, whatever else you do or don't do. So really this is a list of 18 things that cause startups not to make something users want. Nearly all failure funnels through that.1. Single FounderHave you ever noticed how few successful startups were founded by just one person? Even companies you think of as having one founder, like Oracle, usually turn out to have more. It seems unlikely this is a coincidence.What's wrong with having one founder? To start with, it's a vote of no confidence. It probably means the founder couldn't talk any of his friends into starting the company with him. That's pretty alarming, because his friends are the ones who know him best.But even if the founder's friends were all wrong and the company is a good bet, he's still at a disadvantage. Starting a startup is too hard for one person. Even if you could do all the work yourself, you need colleagues to brainstorm with, to talk you out of stupid decisions, and to cheer you up when things go wrong.The last one might be the most important. The low points in a startup are so low that few could bear them alone. When you have multiple founders, esprit de corps binds them together in a way that seems to violate conservation laws. Each thinks "I can't let my friends down." This is one of the most powerful forces in human nature, and it's missing when there's just one founder.2. Bad LocationStartups prosper in some places and not others. Silicon Valley dominates, then Boston, then Seattle, Austin, Denver, and New York. After that there's not much. Even in New York the number of startups per capita is probably a 20th of what it is in Silicon Valley. In towns like Houston and Chicago and Detroit it's too small to measure.Why is the falloff so sharp? Probably for the same reason it is in other industries. What's the sixth largest fashion center in the US? The sixth largest center for oil, or finance, or publishing? Whatever they are they're probably so far from the top that it would be misleading even to call them centers.It's an interesting question why cities become startup hubs, but the reason startups prosper in them is probably the same as it is for any industry: that's where the experts are. Standards are higher; people are more sympathetic to what you're doing; the kind of people you want to hire want to live there; supporting industries are there; the people you run into in chance meetings are in the same business. Who knows exactly how these factors combine to boost startups in Silicon Valley and squish them in Detroit, but it's clear they do from the number of startups per capita in each.3. Marginal NicheMost of the groups that apply to Y Combinator suffer from a common problem: choosing a small, obscure niche in the hope of avoiding competition.If you watch little kids playing sports, you notice that below a certain age they're afraid of the ball. When the ball comes near them their instinct is to avoid it. I didn't make a lot of catches as an eight year old outfielder, because whenever a fly ball came my way, I used to close my eyes and hold my glove up more for protection than in the hope of catching it.Choosing a marginal project is the startup equivalent of my eight year old strategy for dealing with fly balls. If you make anything good, you're going to have competitors, so you may as well face that. You can only avoid competition by avoiding good ideas.I think this shrinking from big problems is mostly unconscious. It's not that people think of grand ideas but decide to pursue smaller ones because they seem safer. Your unconscious won't even let you think of grand ideas. So the solution may be to think about ideas without involving yourself. What would be a great idea for someone else to do as a startup?4. Derivative IdeaMany of the applications we get are imitations of some existing company. That's one source of ideas, but not the best. If you look at the origins of successful startups, few were started in imitation of some other startup. Where did they get their ideas? Usually from some specific, unsolved problem the founders identified.Our startup made software for making online stores. When we started it, there wasn't any; the few sites you could order from were hand-made at great expense by web consultants. We knew that if online shopping ever took off, these sites would have to be generated by software, so we wrote some. Pretty straightforward.It seems like the best problems to solve are ones that affect you personally. Apple happened because Steve Wozniak wanted a computer, Google because Larry and Sergey couldn't find stuff online, Hotmail because Sabeer Bhatia and Jack Smith couldn't exchange email at work.So instead of copying the Facebook, with some variation that the Facebook rightly ignored, look for ideas from the other direction. Instead of starting from companies and working back to the problems they solved, look for problems and imagine the company that might solve them. [2] What do people complain about? What do you wish there was?5. ObstinacyIn some fields the way to succeed is to have a vision of what you want to achieve, and to hold true to it no matter what setbacks you encounter. Starting startups is not one of them. The stick-to-your-vision approach works for something like winning an Olympic gold medal, where the problem is well-defined. Startups are more like science, where you need to follow the trail wherever it leads.So don't get too attached to your original plan, because it's probably wrong. Most successful startups end up doing something different than they originally intended—often so different that it doesn't even seem like the same company. You have to be prepared to see the better idea when it arrives. And the hardest part of that is often discarding your old idea.But openness to new ideas has to be tuned just right. Switching to a new idea every week will be equally fatal. Is there some kind of external test you can use? One is to ask whether the ideas represent some kind of progression. If in each new idea you're able to re-use most of what you built for the previous ones, then you're probably in a process that converges. Whereas if you keep restarting from scratch, that's a bad sign.Fortunately there's someone you can ask for advice: your users. If you're thinking about turning in some new direction and your users seem excited about it, it's probably a good bet.6. Hiring Bad ProgrammersI forgot to include this in the early versions of the list, because nearly all the founders I know are programmers. This is not a serious problem for them. They might accidentally hire someone bad, but it's not going to kill the company. In a pinch they can do whatever's required themselves.But when I think about what killed most of the startups in the e-commerce business back in the 90s, it was bad programmers. A lot of those companies were started by business guys who thought the way startups worked was that you had some clever idea and then hired programmers to implement it. That's actually much harder than it sounds—almost impossibly hard in fact—because business guys can't tell which are the good programmers. They don't even get a shot at the best ones, because no one really good wants a job implementing the vision of a business guy.In practice what happens is that the business guys choose people they think are good programmers (it says here on his resume that he's a Microsoft Certified Developer) but who aren't. Then they're mystified to find that their startup lumbers along like a World War II bomber while their competitors scream past like jet fighters. This kind of startup is in the same position as a big company, but without the advantages.So how do you pick good programmers if you're not a programmer? I don't think there's an answer. I was about to say you'd have to find a good programmer to help you hire people. But if you can't recognize good programmers, how would you even do that?7. Choosing the Wrong PlatformA related problem (since it tends to be done by bad programmers) is choosing the wrong platform. For example, I think a lot of startups during the Bubble killed themselves by deciding to build server-based applications on Windows. Hotmail was still running on FreeBSD for years after Microsoft bought it, presumably because Windows couldn't handle the load. If Hotmail's founders had chosen to use Windows, they would have been swamped.PayPal only just dodged this bullet. After they merged with X.com, the new CEO wanted to switch to Windows—even after PayPal cofounder Max Levchin showed that their software scaled only 1% as well on Windows as Unix. Fortunately for PayPal they switched CEOs instead.Platform is a vague word. It could mean an operating system, or a programming language, or a "framework" built on top of a programming language. It implies something that both supports and limits, like the foundation of a house.The scary thing about platforms is that there are always some that seem to outsiders to be fine, responsible choices and yet, like Windows in the 90s, will destroy you if you choose them. Java applets were probably the most spectacular example. This was supposed to be the new way of delivering applications. Presumably it killed just about 100% of the startups who believed that.How do you pick the right platforms? The usual way is to hire good programmers and let them choose. But there is a trick you could use if you're not a programmer: visit a top computer science department and see what they use in research projects.8. Slowness in LaunchingCompanies of all sizes have a hard time getting software done. It's intrinsic to the medium; software is always 85% done. It takes an effort of will to push through this and get something released to users. [3]Startups make all kinds of excuses for delaying their launch. Most are equivalent to the ones people use for procrastinating in everyday life. There's something that needs to happen first. Maybe. But if the software were 100% finished and ready to launch at the push of a button, would they still be waiting?One reason to launch quickly is that it forces you to actually finish some quantum of work. Nothing is truly finished till it's released; you can see that from the rush of work that's always involved in releasing anything, no matter how finished you thought it was. The other reason you need to launch is that it's only by bouncing your idea off users that you fully understand it.Several distinct problems manifest themselves as delays in launching: working too slowly; not truly understanding the problem; fear of having to deal with users; fear of being judged; working on too many different things; excessive perfectionism. Fortunately you can combat all of them by the simple expedient of forcing yourself to launch something fairly quickly.9. Launching Too EarlyLaunching too slowly has probably killed a hundred times more startups than launching too fast, but it is possible to launch too fast. The danger here is that you ruin your reputation. You launch something, the early adopters try it out, and if it's no good they may never come back.So what's the minimum you need to launch? We suggest startups think about what they plan to do, identify a core that's both (a) useful on its own and (b) something that can be incrementally expanded into the whole project, and then get that done as soon as possible.This is the same approach I (and many other programmers) use for writing software. Think about the overall goal, then start by writing the smallest subset of it that does anything useful. If it's a subset, you'll have to write it anyway, so in the worst case you won't be wasting your time. But more likely you'll find that implementing a working subset is both good for morale and helps you see more clearly what the rest should do.The early adopters you need to impress are fairly tolerant. They don't expect a newly launched product to do everything; it just has to do something.10. Having No Specific User in MindYou can't build things users like without understanding them. I mentioned earlier that the most successful startups seem to have begun by trying to solve a problem their founders had. Perhaps there's a rule here: perhaps you create wealth in proportion to how well you understand the problem you're solving, and the problems you understand best are your own. [4]That's just a theory. What's not a theory is the converse: if you're trying to solve problems you don't understand, you're hosed.And yet a surprising number of founders seem willing to assume that someone, they're not sure exactly who, will want what they're building. Do the founders want it? No, they're not the target market. Who is? Teenagers. People interested in local events (that one is a perennial tarpit). Or "business" users. What business users? Gas stations? Movie studios? Defense contractors?You can of course build something for users other than yourself. We did. But you should realize you're stepping into dangerous territory. You're flying on instruments, in effect, so you should (a) consciously shift gears, instead of assuming you can rely on your intuitions as you ordinarily would, and (b) look at the instruments.In this case the instruments are the users. When designing for other people you have to be empirical. You can no longer guess what will work; you have to find users and measure their responses. So if you're going to make something for teenagers or "business" users or some other group that doesn't include you, you have to be able to talk some specific ones into using what you're making. If you can't, you're on the wrong track.11. Raising Too Little MoneyMost successful startups take funding at some point. Like having more than one founder, it seems a good bet statistically. How much should you take, though?Startup funding is measured in time. Every startup that isn't profitable (meaning nearly all of them, initially) has a certain amount of time left before the money runs out and they have to stop. This is sometimes referred to as runway, as in "How much runway do you have left?" It's a good metaphor because it reminds you that when the money runs out you're going to be airborne or dead.Too little money means not enough to get airborne. What airborne means depends on the situation. Usually you have to advance to a visibly higher level: if all you have is an idea, a working prototype; if you have a prototype, launching; if you're launched, significant growth. It depends on investors, because until you're profitable that's who you have to convince.So if you take money from investors, you have to take enough to get to the next step, whatever that is. [5] Fortunately you have some control over both how much you spend and what the next step is. We advise startups to set both low, initially: spend practically nothing, and make your initial goal simply to build a solid prototype. This gives you maximum flexibility.12. Spending Too MuchIt's hard to distinguish spending too much from raising too little. If you run out of money, you could say either was the cause. The only way to decide which to call it is by comparison with other startups. If you raised five million and ran out of money, you probably spent too much.Burning through too much money is not as common as it used to be. Founders seem to have learned that lesson. Plus it keeps getting cheaper to start a startup. So as of this writing few startups spend too much. None of the ones we've funded have. (And not just because we make small investments; many have gone on to raise further rounds.)The classic way to burn through cash is by hiring a lot of people. This bites you twice: in addition to increasing your costs, it slows you down—so money that's getting consumed faster has to last longer. Most hackers understand why that happens; Fred Brooks explained it in The Mythical Man-Month.We have three general suggestions about hiring: (a) don't do it if you can avoid it, (b) pay people with equity rather than salary, not just to save money, but because you want the kind of people who are committed enough to prefer that, and (c) only hire people who are either going to write code or go out and get users, because those are the only things you need at first.13. Raising Too Much MoneyIt's obvious how too little money could kill you, but is there such a thing as having too much?Yes and no. The problem is not so much the money itself as what comes with it. As one VC who spoke at Y Combinator said, "Once you take several million dollars of my money, the clock is ticking." If VCs fund you, they're not going to let you just put the money in the bank and keep operating as two guys living on ramen. They want that money to go to work. [6] At the very least you'll move into proper office space and hire more people. That will change the atmosphere, and not entirely for the better. Now most of your people will be employees rather than founders. They won't be as committed; they'll need to be told what to do; they'll start to engage in office politics.When you raise a lot of money, your company moves to the suburbs and has kids.Perhaps more dangerously, once you take a lot of money it gets harder to change direction. Suppose your initial plan was to sell something to companies. After taking VC money you hire a sales force to do that. What happens now if you realize you should be making this for consumers instead of businesses? That's a completely different kind of selling. What happens, in practice, is that you don't realize that. The more people you have, the more you stay pointed in the same direction.Another drawback of large investments is the time they take. The time required to raise money grows with the amount. [7] When the amount rises into the millions, investors get very cautious. VCs never quite say yes or no; they just engage you in an apparently endless conversation. Raising VC scale investments is thus a huge time sink—more work, probably, than the startup itself. And you don't want to be spending all your time talking to investors while your competitors are spending theirs building things.We advise founders who go on to seek VC money to take the first reasonable deal they get. If you get an offer from a reputable firm at a reasonable valuation with no unusually onerous terms, just take it and get on with building the company. [8] Who cares if you could get a 30% better deal elsewhere? Economically, startups are an all-or-nothing game. Bargain-hunting among investors is a waste of time.14. Poor Investor ManagementAs a founder, you have to manage your investors. You shouldn't ignore them, because they may have useful insights. But neither should you let them run the company. That's supposed to be your job. If investors had sufficient vision to run the companies they fund, why didn't they start them?Pissing off investors by ignoring them is probably less dangerous than caving in to them. In our startup, we erred on the ignoring side. A lot of our energy got drained away in disputes with investors instead of going into the product. But this was less costly than giving in, which would probably have destroyed the company. If the founders know what they're doing, it's better to have half their attention focused on the product than the full attention of investors who don't.How hard you have to work on managing investors usually depends on how much money you've taken. When you raise VC-scale money, the investors get a great deal of control. If they have a board majority, they're literally your bosses. In the more common case, where founders and investors are equally represented and the deciding vote is cast by neutral outside directors, all the investors have to do is convince the outside directors and they control the company.If things go well, this shouldn't matter. So long as you seem to be advancing rapidly, most investors will leave you alone. But things don't always go smoothly in startups. Investors have made trouble even for the most successful companies. One of the most famous examples is Apple, whose board made a nearly fatal blunder in firing Steve Jobs. Apparently even Google got a lot of grief from their investors early on.15. Sacrificing Users to (Supposed) ProfitWhen I said at the beginning that if you make something users want, you'll be fine, you may have noticed I didn't mention anything about having the right business model. That's not because making money is unimportant. I'm not suggesting that founders start companies with no chance of making money in the hope of unloading them before they tank. The reason we tell founders not to worry about the business model initially is that making something people want is so much harder.I don't know why it's so hard to make something people want. It seems like it should be straightforward. But you can tell it must be hard by how few startups do it.Because making something people want is so much harder than making money from it, you should leave business models for later, just as you'd leave some trivial but messy feature for version 2. In version 1, solve the core problem. And the core problem in a startup is how to create wealth (= how much people want something x the number who want it), not how to convert that wealth into money.The companies that win are the ones that put users first. Google, for example. They made search work, then worried about how to make money from it. And yet some startup founders still think it's irresponsible not to focus on the business model from the beginning. They're often encouraged in this by investors whose experience comes from less malleable industries.It is irresponsible not to think about business models. It's just ten times more irresponsible not to think about the product.16. Not Wanting to Get Your Hands DirtyNearly all programmers would rather spend their time writing code and have someone else handle the messy business of extracting money from it. And not just the lazy ones. Larry and Sergey apparently felt this way too at first. After developing their new search algorithm, the first thing they tried was to get some other company to buy it.Start a company? Yech. Most hackers would rather just have ideas. But as Larry and Sergey found, there's not much of a market for ideas. No one trusts an idea till you embody it in a product and use that to grow a user base. Then they'll pay big time.Maybe this will change, but I doubt it will change much. There's nothing like users for convincing acquirers. It's not just that the risk is decreased. The acquirers are human, and they have a hard time paying a bunch of young guys millions of dollars just for being clever. When the idea is embodied in a company with a lot of users, they can tell themselves they're buying the users rather than the cleverness, and this is easier for them to swallow. [9]If you're going to attract users, you'll probably have to get up from your computer and go find some. It's unpleasant work, but if you can make yourself do it you have a much greater chance of succeeding. In the first batch of startups we funded, in the summer of 2005, most of the founders spent all their time building their applications. But there was one who was away half the time talking to executives at cell phone companies, trying to arrange deals. Can you imagine anything more painful for a hacker? [10] But it paid off, because this startup seems the most successful of that group by an order of magnitude.If you want to start a startup, you have to face the fact that you can't just hack. At least one hacker will have to spend some of the time doing business stuff.17. Fights Between FoundersFights between founders are surprisingly common. About 20% of the startups we've funded have had a founder leave. It happens so often that we've reversed our attitude to vesting. We still don't require it, but now we advise founders to vest so there will be an orderly way for people to quit.A founder leaving doesn't necessarily kill a startup, though. Plenty of successful startups have had that happen. [11] Fortunately it's usually the least committed founder who leaves. If there are three founders and one who was lukewarm leaves, big deal. If you have two and one leaves, or a guy with critical technical skills leaves, that's more of a problem. But even that is survivable. Blogger got down to one person, and they bounced back.Most of the disputes I've seen between founders could have been avoided if they'd been more careful about who they started a company with. Most disputes are not due to the situation but the people. Which means they're inevitable. And most founders who've been burned by such disputes probably had misgivings, which they suppressed, when they started the company. Don't suppress misgivings. It's much easier to fix problems before the company is started than after. So don't include your housemate in your startup because he'd feel left out otherwise. Don't start a company with someone you dislike because they have some skill you need and you worry you won't find anyone else. The people are the most important ingredient in a startup, so don't compromise there.18. A Half-Hearted EffortThe failed startups you hear most about are the spectactular flameouts. Those are actually the elite of failures. The most common type is not the one that makes spectacular mistakes, but the one that doesn't do much of anything—the one we never even hear about, because it was some project a couple guys started on the side while working on their day jobs, but which never got anywhere and was gradually abandoned.Statistically, if you want to avoid failure, it would seem like the most important thing is to quit your day job. Most founders of failed startups don't quit their day jobs, and most founders of successful ones do. If startup failure were a disease, the CDC would be issuing bulletins warning people to avoid day jobs.Does that mean you should quit your day job? Not necessarily. I'm guessing here, but I'd guess that many of these would-be founders may not have the kind of determination it takes to start a company, and that in the back of their minds, they know it. The reason they don't invest more time in their startup is that they know it's a bad investment. [12]I'd also guess there's some band of people who could have succeeded if they'd taken the leap and done it full-time, but didn't. I have no idea how wide this band is, but if the winner/borderline/hopeless progression has the sort of distribution you'd expect, the number of people who could have made it, if they'd quit their day job, is probably an order of magnitude larger than the number who do make it. [13]If that's true, most startups that could succeed fail because the founders don't devote their whole efforts to them. That certainly accords with what I see out in the world. Most startups fail because they don't make something people want, and the reason most don't is that they don't try hard enough.In other words, starting startups is just like everything else. The biggest mistake you can make is not to try hard enough. To the extent there's a secret to success, it's not to be in denial about that.Notes[1] This is not a complete list of the causes of failure, just those you can control. There are also several you can't, notably ineptitude and bad luck.[2] Ironically, one variant of the Facebook that might work is a facebook exclusively for college students.[3] Steve Jobs tried to motivate people by saying "Real artists ship." This is a fine sentence, but unfortunately not true. Many famous works of art are unfinished. It's true in fields that have hard deadlines, like architecture and filmmaking, but even there people tend to be tweaking stuff till it's yanked out of their hands.[4] There's probably also a second factor: startup founders tend to be at the leading edge of technology, so problems they face are probably especially valuable.[5] You should take more than you think you'll need, maybe 50% to 100% more, because software takes longer to write and deals longer to close than you expect.[6] Since people sometimes call us VCs, I should add that we're not. VCs invest large amounts of other people's money. We invest small amounts of our own, like angel investors.[7] Not linearly of course, or it would take forever to raise five million dollars. In practice it just feels like it takes forever.Though if you include the cases where VCs don't invest, it would literally take forever in the median case. And maybe we should, because the danger of chasing large investments is not just that they take a long time. That's the best case. The real danger is that you'll expend a lot of time and get nothing.[8] Some VCs will offer you an artificially low valuation to see if you have the balls to ask for more. It's lame that VCs play such games, but some do. If you're dealing with one of those you should push back on the valuation a bit.[9] Suppose YouTube's founders had gone to Google in 2005 and told them "Google Video is badly designed. Give us $10 million and we'll tell you all the mistakes you made." They would have gotten the royal raspberry. Eighteen months later Google paid $1.6 billion for the same lesson, partly because they could then tell themselves that they were buying a phenomenon, or a community, or some vague thing like that.I don't mean to be hard on Google. They did better than their competitors, who may have now missed the video boat entirely.[10] Yes, actually: dealing with the government. But phone companies are up there.[11] Many more than most people realize, because companies don't advertise this. Did you know Apple originally had three founders?[12] I'm not dissing these people. I don't have the determination myself. I've twice come close to starting startups since Viaweb, and both times I bailed because I realized that without the spur of poverty I just wasn't willing to endure the stress of a startup.[13] So how do you know whether you're in the category of people who should quit their day job, or the presumably larger one who shouldn't? I got to the point of saying that this was hard to judge for yourself and that you should seek outside advice, before realizing that that's what we do. We think of ourselves as investors, but viewed from the other direction Y Combinator is a service for advising people whether or not to quit their day job. We could be mistaken, and no doubt often are, but we do at least bet money on our conclusions.Thanks to Sam Altman, Jessica Livingston, Greg McAdoo, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this. -
《YC创业营》是一本描述YC整个运作流程，并阐述其投资理念的书，干货满满。如何定义大名鼎鼎的YC？在读这本书之前，我给他贴的标签是孵化器。然而，读完这本书后，我更愿意把他归为带有种子投资功能的创业学校。如今，国内各种创业孵化器如雨后春笋般喷涌而出，但很多仅仅是提供一个办公场地而已，少数会具备一些投资功能，但真正脱颖而出的却少之又少。让我们看一看YC为什么会成功：首先也是最关键的，需要有一个核心人物，对YC来说这个人无疑就是保罗.格雷厄姆。他是一个成功的创业者，自己的创业项目viaweb被雅虎以4500万美元收购。同时，他也是一个创业领域的布道者，他经常会在自己的博客上写关于创业的文章。在YC期间，他会主导项目筛选、创业辅导甚至指导创业者演讲。其次，YC带有投资功能，尽管单笔投资金额很小，但想要获得投资并不容易，60+公司需要在2000+个申请项目中脱颖而出。获得YC投资后往往会有更好的项目质量背书。最后，YC设置了很科学的运作模式，每年分春秋两季选拔，入选项目只有3个月的开发时间，最后所有项目都要亮剑DEMO DAY。所以，项目的孵化期是有限的，创业者会更加专注、紧迫和心无旁骛。出乎我意料的是，YC并不会提供办公场地，而是仅围绕其Base所在独立租房办公，但每周二晚又会聚会交流，松散而又紧密。令我印象深刻的是，老美创业的idea虽然很多跟国内一样也不怎么靠谱，但初心却都很好，而且多数1号人物都是技术派出身。国内创业者则bp里经常会标好A轮B轮新三板，目的明显是不同的。所以，国内的很多创业企业主营就是烧钱和圈钱。 -
中国人喜欢谈的一直是立业和守业，这两者都和创业的概念并不相同，立业更多的时候是指找到自己在社会中的定位，哪怕你只是在政府看大门，只要你有正式编制，也算是立业啦。而创业则是创造新的事物，创造必然有着打破旧规矩的意思，这在中国的传统中，是很不被鼓励的。幸运的是，我们生活在今天这样一个充满创业氛围的环境里。但是，究竟该如何创业，创作需要注意什么？也许，《YC创业营》可以解答一些问题。创业究竟该做什么？YC创业营是保罗·格雷厄姆在2005年成立的一个创业基金会，旨在为年轻创业者提供风投。格雷厄姆本人属于最早一批的互联网创业者之一，他曾成功把自己的公司Viawed以5000万美金卖给雅虎，实现了人生的飞跃。但在Viawed之前，他曾在1995年创立了一家为艺术画廊提供软件服务的公司Artix，但当时几乎没有画廊需要这个艺术品在线销售服务软件，因此，这家公司以失败告终。Artix的失败告诉格雷厄姆，创业者应该提供客户真正需要的东西。现在都在谈产品即是营销，如果一件产品的价值足以打动客户，那么，它本身就能够带来繁殖和利润的增加，根本无需大费周折的去做营销。同样，创业者如果能给客户提供他们真正需要的东西，这个创业就不可能是失败的。因此，YC创业营更看重那些已经把产品成功推销给客户并且已经盈利的团队，格雷厄姆认为，这样对彼此都是共赢。创业者的品质比项目本身重要格雷厄姆看重创业者身上具有的与成功密不可分的品质，相对于项目他更看重创业者本身的素质，在他看来，这包括“精力、贫穷、无根、同窗和无知”，能够全身心的投入几乎是做好任何事情最起码的必备要素，更遑论创业；而贫穷和无根可以让创业者保持向前走的动力，而不会退回到安全的港湾，在这种时候，就不存在失败这个词，因为失败也是创业的一部分。格雷厄姆的亲身经历说明了贫穷对创业的重要性，在成功创业并得到一辈子吃穿不愁的钱之后，他已经“失去了贫穷的鞭策，无法再次承受住创业的重重压力”。创业是对自由的追求在最近对邓超的一次采访中，他说能够让自己走到今天的是对自由的追求。其实对于每一个创业者来说，自由都是能够让他们坚持不懈走下去的最原始的驱动力，而绝不仅仅是金钱。实际上，许多创业者完全可以在一个相对比较稳定的地方获得丰厚收入，可是，他们不愿意把自己的人生设定成日复一日的重复模式，更愿意去面对挑战，而这最终成就了我们今天所看到的伟大的企业和企业家。但是，获得自由就需要付出代价，为了成为20%能够自由支配时间的人，创业者所付出的时间和辛劳要远远大于打工者。即便今天饱受诟病的996（早九晚九周六）工作方式，和创业者所付出的时间比较起来，也是无法相提并论的，事实上，许多创业者每天工作超过13个小时，都是属于常态的。而且，他们不会拿自己的时间开玩笑，更不会混日子，所以是实实在在的工作12个小时以上。创业是一种生活方式其实说到底，创业就是一种对生活的自定义。你抛弃朝九晚五、每月发薪日、五险一金、上班混日子、上下班浪费时间，而选择一条朝不保夕、前途未卜、孤独寂寞的道路，这如果不是出于强烈的热爱和执着，那是很难做到的。格雷厄姆称自己在三年创业时间内，屁股被粘在了椅子上，几乎脱离了生活。这是大多数人所不能忍受的，然而一旦你经受住了创业所带来的种种痛苦，你就像那个苦练功夫最终成为高手的侠者，开始站在人生的顶峰上看待世界，那种感觉真的很奇妙。也许不是物质上的，而是精神上的。创业会“上瘾”创业对创业者来说是会上瘾的“毒药”，一旦你体会过创业时随心所欲的掌控自己命运的快乐，哪怕让你付出比这种快乐多数倍的辛劳你也会愿意。就像格雷厄姆在Viawed被雅虎收购后，无法在雅虎长期待下去一样。如果说，一个产品的气质是由创业者赋予的，那一旦它被别人买走，你就无法继续坚持自己的价值观了。就算乔布斯再强势，也不能要求所有苹果用户都按照他的思想去使用这款手机。所以，把自己的公司卖出去，对创业者来说无异于是抛弃了自己的身份。这样的人，往往还会继续创业。因此，在卖掉Viawed 7年之后，格雷厄姆创立了YC创业营。只不过，这个时候，他有了更多的资本。创新思维书中提到的年龄各异、背景各异的创业者都有着一颗敢于挑战未知的心，他们所创造的产品、想法不管是新奇的、好玩的、实用的，都闪烁着智慧的光芒，并能给我们提供另一种维度的思考方式。麦凯和维洛斯迪克推出的云端上的MongDB新潮数据库，是他们在淘金热时卖铁镐的尝试，既然所有人都在利用互联网赚钱，那他们就赚这些想要用互联网赚钱的人的钱，这不是一个绕口令，反而是一种商业思维。实际上YC至今推出的最成功的产品Hroku就是靠着这种方式挣到了2亿美金。创业者最可爱本书的作者兰德尔·斯特罗斯不仅向人们展示了YC创业营2011夏季项目的整个活动过程，最可贵的是他记录了许多创业者的故事。这其中最有闪光点的当然属于YC创始人格雷厄姆和杰西卡·利文斯顿，实际上，这两个人通过YC结缘，并成为了夫妻。而考威尔和哈金的创业之路，也可以给许多想要辞去自己讨厌的工作投入新生活的人以启发。
精彩短评 (总计49条)
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via xiaoyu 看了几十页时觉得是纽约时报专栏作家写法，翻回去一看，果然是。和所有纽约时报专栏作家写的书一样，讲得一手好故事。创业者可翻翻。 -
按照小主题+相应事实材料组织的，时间线比较混乱。细心审查每一个故事有很多值得学习的地方。PG是个很有意思的人，他网站上有很多essay可看。 -
用项目故事来讲解过程中可能会遇到的问题，章节尾部都有好句回顾，事实上，如果你没时间，只看每章最后一页也行。 -
重在实践 -
YC的精妙之处：（1）以极低的估值分散投资，平均估值不到种子轮的1/5，简直是投到即赚到；（2）只投自己看得懂的，黑客改变世界，即使市场空间不大，即使面向B端；（3）导师诊断制。
YC不能简单的复制到中国，对此我有思考。不写下来。 -
读的过程中觉得内容有些散，刚刚读完，返回看目录的时候，觉得那大概就是YC的运营大纲。还是要反复斟酌关键点，去写个总结吧。 -
翻译得一般。不过对yc创业营有了更系统的了解~ -
开始攒节奏 -
对于想创业或者IT领域的人还是很受用的 -
还可以 -
絮絮叨叨 -
“只有当创业者放弃的时候，创业才算是真正地失败了。” -
20150309读完，每个创业者都应该看，必须以及其精英的态度要求自己，与选择合伙人，并且要充分的相信自己，没有什么是创业需要的但不能学会的，一切只是态度问题。如果你真的有什么学不会，那就别创业了，这个不太适合你 -
作者采用的是描述性的方式，用一堆细节展示YC。在对YC有一定了解的基础上，可以更详细去了解它 -
会讲故事的人才能熬出好喝的鸡汤，嗯。 -
清晰的展现了YC的各个方面，包含了一些创业和投资的方法论，自己印象最深刻的案例是Twitch团队的创业经历。 -
原本可以沿着历史的脉络把它写成一本很有价值的科普读物 结果成了情景再现 -
传说中的YC，这个牛逼的孵化器，这个无数国内创投模仿的对象。了解了很多细节，原以为传说中的美国创业公司和这边不太一样，没想到，团队、资金、PR、合伙人，哪个一样都是问题。一样有YC的明星项目倒的一塌糊涂，一样有精英撕逼撕的一塌糊涂，创业不易，哪里毕业的都是一样的。文中有一段我很震撼，YC手下那一季最牛逼的Dropbox增加的价值是YC所投的剩下公司的所有，第二名又是剩下的总和。创业这事，必须当独角兽。 -
速读下来像看了A版应用创业的Reality Show。快餐味道很浓。我喜欢YC理解"创业"的角度。吸收了YC喜欢的explorer部分特质；对IDEA的慎选建议；强调快速发布MVP（Minimum Viable Product）；获得并评估Users的技巧和建议；对Real Point的理解等。通过MVP获取有效的Users反馈，经过健全的评估迅速促进产品的迭代，这或许是避免产品设计停在虚拟形态的方法之一。软肋是怠惰的MVP、抛物线般下滑的评估和宕机般的迭代，让自己的项目像陀螺一样原地旋转。 -
资金回报和影响力的培养。smart thing。 -
书是好书，翻译得太别扭，信息稍有滞后。 -
了解一下YC的故事，但是觉得作者讲的不精彩，翻译也是生硬 -
参加YC训练营是种什么样的体验 -
了解YC的流程。2011YC的夏季项目好low呀。 -
看看还行。 -
一所创业大学 -
孵化器，当前互联网告诉发展背后的英雄。 -
当小说来看，像是一扇认识孵化器和创业者的大门，偶尔也从他们的故事里获得启发。但还需要从其他地方获得更深入的思考。 -
随便翻翻 -
纪录美国式创业的点滴 -
YC的基本原则：努力写代码并与客户交流；迅速发布原型并迭代开发；专注于可量化的每周目标。 -
好吧，kindle unlimited 就随便看看 -
如果你想YC是本好书，除此之外，不读也罢 -
反正YC说自己不是孵化器。 -
1 -
没有刚看过的Google works 那么有感触，毕竟全民创业孵化离自己的生活还有点遥远，更像是在另一个世界。也许实际体会后会更有感触，读书更多是在寻找自我的心理投影。 -
当小说看看还好了，第三方的观察有全面视角的优势，更有非鱼不知乐的劣势，总体感觉不是本太有内容的书 -
就是讲了YC是怎么选到了大牛的团队，如何选，最后总结还是看人优先。 -
鸡汤鲜美，需要花时间消化。 -
有干货，有启发 -
很多道理其实都懂的，但通过实例介绍出来更容易理解。适合初次创业和准备创业的同学阅读。 -
2017第一本 -
#一.基本构思阶段 -
科普书籍 -
8周倒数 读完了这本书 -
starup的人看的时候能联想，运用的更多吧。我只能拿来当做速读的材料。 -
圈外新人 适合科普 很开眼界的故事 只是跟中国国情相差太多 实在没有可比性 也几乎无法照搬 -
一种可以说成功的模式，但可复制性另说。倒是更想看以每个项目时间线来组织的素材。 -
Y Combinator创业营有他自己特色的地方，1）相比项目更关注项目创始团队成员，不太推荐单枪匹马的创业者；2）相信自己对项目逻辑和市场分析的判断，并不特别关注项目想法够不够大，总之后面有办法让你把事情规模做大；3）推动创业者尽快迭代产品、跟客户沟通，尽量不错过任何一个机会； 4）导师制，让创业者在启动之初快速成长